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Executive Summary 
The implications of sufficiently large quantum computers for widely used public-key cryptography is well-documented and 
increasingly discussed by the security community. An April 2016 report by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
notably, calls out the need for new standards to replace cryptosystems based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm 
problems, which have been shown to be vulnerable to Shor’s quantum algorithm for prime factorization. Specifically, widely used 
RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DSA cryptosystems will need to be replaced by post-quantum cryptography (PQC) alternatives (also 
known as quantum-resistant or quantum-safe cryptography). Failure to transition before sufficiently powerful quantum computers 
are realized will jeopardize the security of public key cryptosystems which are widely deployed within communication protocols, 
digital signing mechanisms, authentication frameworks, and more. To avoid this, NIST has actively led a PQC standardization 
effort since 2016, leveraging a large and international research community. The effort is expected to take six or more years to vet 
proposals, and to select alternatives that are believed to be secure against both quantum and classical computers. Meanwhile, 
many point out the urgency of transition due to the threat of “record now, exploit later” in which encrypted information assets 
are captured and stored today by an adversary for attack later when scaled quantum computers become available.
While NIST’s standardization effort aims to determine which PQC algorithms are robust enough to provide suitable alternatives for 
the threat of quantum computers, that effort does not address the problem of migration from today’s widely deployed algorithms 
to future PQC alternatives across the diversity of computer systems that serve our society. Today, there are more than 4.1 
billion Internet users, nearly 2 billion websites, and more than 3 trillion dollars in retail activity associated with the Internet.[5] 
Underlying this explosive digital transformation of the world as we know it are security and privacy technologies relying on public 
key cryptographic standards at many layers. The extensiveness of public key cryptography usage across the Internet means that 
an industry-wide migration to quantum safe cryptography standards (i.e., PQC) will be a massive undertaking, and one that is 
complicated by the layered complexity and heterogeneity of the worldwide compute infrastructure we operate. It will challenge, 
domain by domain, the fabric of our compute infrastructure and involve myriad organizations, from those who contribute widely 
used software and hardware components to the much larger number of operators who deploy and manage the constituent 
pieces of secure infrastructure globally. It is no wonder that prior history shows cryptographic migrations (e.g., 3DES to AES, MD5 
to SHA1, SHA1 to SHA2, RSA to ECC) to take a decade or more before completion.
On January 31-February 1, 2019, the Computing Community Consortium (CCC) held a workshop in Washington, D.C. to discuss 
research challenges associated with PQC migration. Entitled, “Identifying Research Challenges in Post Quantum Cryptography 
Migration and Cryptographic Agility”, participants came from three distinct yet related communities: cryptographers contributing 
to the NIST PQC standards effort, applied cryptographers with expertise in creating cryptographic solutions and implementing 
cryptography in real-world settings, and industry practitioners with expertise in deploying cryptographic standards within 
products and compute infrastructures. Discussion centered around two key themes: identifying constituent challenges in PQC 
migration and imagining a new science of “cryptographic agility”.
Key findings for PQC migration include:
◗  There is an important need for research to understand and quantify the implications of replacing today’s public cryptography 
algorithms (e.g., RSA, ECDH, ECDSA, DSA) with PQC alternatives across a wide variety of implementation and deployment contexts.
◗  Given that PQC algorithms generally have greater computation, memory, storage, and communication requirements (e.g., larger 
key sizes, more complex algorithms, or both), research and prototyping is needed to better understand performance, security, 
and implementation considerations.
5◗  Research is needed on approaches to introducing new PQC algorithms (e.g., hybrids) within live systems that must remain 
interoperable with other systems during the period of massive industry migration. This includes such areas as formal modeling, 
automated tools, and approaching transition in complex infrastructures.
Key findings for cryptographic agility include:
◗  There is a need to broaden and recast traditional notions of cryptographic agility in light of the size and complexity of global 
PQC migration. A new science of cryptographic agility should include an expanded set of goals, a more comprehensive set of 
compute domains, a broader range of agility modalities and time scales, and the full canon of security research methodologies.
◗  Research on cryptographic agility should include frameworks and architectures that enable agility across a wide variety of 
compute contexts, usable interfaces addressing various user roles, a better understanding of security and complexity tradeoffs, 
and other defining challenges.
◗  Context agility, or cryptographic frameworks that automatically select among algorithms and configuration based on the context 
of use, represents a long-term research vision that could shape the field.
◗  Cryptographic agility, independent of PQC migration, offers the benefit of making security systems more robust against 
algorithmic breakthroughs, revealed implementation flaws, emerging hardware accelerators, and other threats. It enables 
change in response to evolving security policy within an organization and support for new cryptographic features. 
◗  In the context of PQC, it enables agility across multiple standards likely to be approved by NIST.
Additional findings include:
◗  Fundamental research is needed on policy, process, and people since these determine whether and when PQC adoption occurs 
at all.
◗  Research is needed on the frontiers of cryptography; that is, how PQC migration and cryptographic agility will apply to newer 
cryptography fields like secure multi-party computation, fully homomorphic encryption, blockchain, and more.
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11. Introduction: Why Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC)?
In this section, we discuss the implications of quantum computing for public key cryptography and motivations for research into 
the systems and issues surrounding deploying PQC in practice.
1.1 The Threat of Quantum Computing to Cryptography
Quantum computing, or the use of quantum mechanical phenomena to represent and manipulate information, promises to be 
a game-changing technology when fully realized at scale. Many problems that are now considered to be intractably complex 
for conventional computers, even the most powerful supercomputers, could become computable in minutes or seconds by 
harnessing the properties of quantum physics (e.g., entanglement, superposition) to represent information. Initial applications of 
quantum computing include the simulation of complex molecular systems in chemistry and material science, high-dimensional 
machine learning classification, and optimization problems over an extremely large space of possible solutions.
While quantum computing creates a whole new paradigm for solving complex computing problems, unfortunately it also enables 
a powerful new tool for attacking our existing cryptography algorithms. This makes it an important threat to Internet security 
as we know it today. To explain, public key (asymmetric) cryptography relies on trapdoor mathematical functions which allow 
the easy computation of a public key from a private key but make the computation of a private key from a public key (the 
inverse) computationally infeasible. Widely used trapdoor functions rely on the difficulty of integer factorization and elliptic curve 
variants of the discrete logarithm problem, both of which have no known solution for computing an inverse in polynomial time 
with conventional computing. In symmetric key cryptography, the security of a key shared between two parties relies on how 
difficult the random key is for an attacker to guess. If the value cannot be determined directly by cryptanalysis, the attacker may 
apply search methods to examine the space of possible keys looking for the correct value. But given a sufficiently large space 
of possible values, finding a key is computationally infeasible for the window of time during which the scheme is employed to 
protect data.
In 1994, Peter Shor showed how a quantum computer (QC), if it were to exist in a scalable form, could be used to perform integer 
factorization in polynomial time (polynomial in log N on integer size N) using modular exponentiation by repeated squaring and a 
quantum Fourier transform that he designed.[1] Shor’s algorithm, as it is now called, has been shown to generalize to also solve 
the discrete logarithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time. For an attacker with a sufficiently large 
QC, this effectively “breaks” the security of key trapdoor functions that our widely used public key infrastructure has relied upon 
for years. That is, an attacker could use a QC to obtain private cryptographic keys from public keys quickly and efficiently. In 1996, 
Lov Kumar Grover furthermore showed that QCs could be used to solve the problem of linear search over an unsorted N-element 
space in O(√N) operations using a special diffusion operator that he developed.[2] For adversaries with a QC, Grover’s algorithm 
implies the weakening of our symmetric key algorithms by proposing a more efficient way to search the space of possible keys 
in order to obtain the secret value. In 1999, Gilles Brassard et al. showed that QCs could be used to solve the problem of finding 
hash function collisions in O(3√N) operations using Grover’s algorithm.[28]
The implications of these surprising results to public and symmetric key cryptography are well-documented. Both the NSA/CSS 
IAD “Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite and Quantum Computing FAQ” of January 2016 [3] and the NIST “Report on 
Post-Quantum Cryptography” [4] of April 2016 call out the need for new standards to replace cryptosystems based on integer 
factorization and discrete logarithm problems. This includes replacing widely used RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DSA cryptosystems 
with post-quantum cryptography (PQC) alternatives. (PQC is also known as quantum-resistant or quantum-safe cryptography.) 
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In December of 2016, NIST took a major step forward in 
addressing the situation by announcing a call for PQC 
algorithm proposals to be considered for standardization 
in a 6-year selection process. More than 80 proposals 
were submitted by the November 30, 2017 deadline, 
and the First PQC Standardization Conference was 
held on April 11-13, 2018 in Fort Lauderdale, FL. This 
initiative effectively organizes the cryptographic 
research community — including academic, industry, and 
government cryptography experts —  into a focused effort 
to propose and vet the most robust alternatives suitable 
for new and quantum safe public key cryptography 
standards. 
While symmetric key cryptography and secure hash 
functions are also impacted by the threat of quantum 
computing due to Grover’s algorithm and the algorithm 
of Brassard et al., increasing key sizes and output sizes, 
respectively, is a well-understood approach to remediate. 
Changes to key and hash output sizes, in practice, is 
highly impactful to widely deployed cryptography for 
data in motion and at rest and will require considerable 
engineering to make the transition. But our focus 
henceforth will be on research surrounding the newer 
and less understood problem of replacing our public key 
cryptography algorithms with quantum safe alternatives. 
Additionally, many point out that implementing Grover’s 
algorithm on QCs is expected to be difficult in practice due 
to long-running serial computations and the need for deep 
circuits.[19,29] 
Note the important and clarifying distinction between 
Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key 
Distribution (QKD) which are often confused. While PQC 
focuses on cryptographic algorithms that are resistant 
to QC attacks, QKD is a quantum technology for securely 
distributing shared cryptographic keys between two 
endpoints. QKD leverages the properties of quantum 
mechanics and is often implemented using polarized 
photons or entangled pairs of photons over fiber optics, 
although schemes also exist for free space. Technologies 
related to QKD include quantum communications which 
enables the exchange of qubits and entanglement 
between quantum computers, and quantum networks 
which looks at the use of quantum communications to 
connect multiple sites across larger geographic areas. Our 
focus here is on PQC which will be widely implemented on 
conventional computing systems as a safeguard against 
scaled QCs which are likely to exist in the future. 
1.2 The Problem of PQC Migration: An 
Approaching Storm
While NIST’s standardization effort is aimed squarely at the 
problem of determining which cryptographic algorithms 
are robust enough to provide safe alternatives for a post-
QC world, there is another major challenge to consider: 
that of migrating our extensive infrastructure from 
today’s widely deployed algorithms to PQC alternatives. 
We argue that far from a mere “practical consideration”, 
this migration is in need of extensive research as a 
companion domain.
Today, there are more than 4.1 billion Internet users, nearly 
2 billion websites, and more than 3 trillion dollars in retail 
activity associated with the Internet.[5] Underlying this 
explosive digital transformation of the world as we know 
Figure 1: Impact of QC on cryptography algorithms (Source: NIST)
Cryptographic Algorithm Type Purpose
Impact from large-scale 
quantum compuer
AES Symmetric key Encryption Larger key sizes needed
SHA-2, SHA-3 ----- Hash functions Larger output needed
RSA Public key Signatures, key 
establishment
No longer secure
ECDSA, ECDH  
(Elliptic Curve Cryptography)
Public key Signatures, key 
exchange
No longer secure
DSA  
(Finite Field Cryptography)
Public key Signatures, key 
exchange
No longer secure
3it (e-commerce, e-trading, e-government, e-health, social 
media, smartphone apps, and more) are security and 
privacy technologies relying on public key cryptography 
standards at many layers. Cryptographic transport 
protocols secure end-to-end communication exchanges 
between Internet endpoints; public key infrastructure 
uses digital certificates to verify the identity of parties 
before private data is transferred; public key cryptography 
is used to seal symmetric cryptography keys in many 
contexts of bulk data encryption; digital signatures are 
used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of operating 
system and application software updates; cryptographic 
protocols are used to authenticate users and manage 
identities across systems and services; public key 
cryptography is used to securely manage public and private 
cloud infrastructures, including the transfer and storage 
of private data; hardware devices use cryptographic 
features to prevent data leakage and to store secrets 
securely; and much, much more. An illustrative list of 
public key cryptography applications might include Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI), key management systems, 
authenticated web communication (TLS), secure point-to-
point communication (SSH), transport security (IPSec), key 
agreement, identification and authentication, password-
authenticated key exchange (PAKE), PGP/GPG, Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), Kerberos, 
Over-the-Air Rekeying (OTAR), Domain Name System 
Security Extensions (DNSSEC), Encrypted File Systems, 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE), ZRTP (a secure VoIP protocol), 
and more. In fact, a full description of cryptography usage 
domains is so large, it is beyond the scope of this report 
to enumerate.
The extensiveness of public key cryptography usage 
across the Internet (and within private networks) 
means that an industry-wide migration to quantum 
safe cryptography standards (i.e., PQC) will be a massive 
and global undertaking, and one that is complicated 
by the layered complexity and heterogeneity of the 
worldwide compute infrastructure we operate. It will 
challenge, domain by domain, the fabric of our compute 
infrastructure and involve myriad organizations, from 
those who contribute widely used software and hardware 
components to the much larger number of operators who 
deploy and manage the constituent pieces of secure 
infrastructure globally. It is no wonder that prior history 
shows cryptographic migrations (e.g., 3DES to AES, MD5 to 
SHA1, SHA1 to SHA2, RSA to ECC) to take a decade or more 
before completion.
While the realization of scaled quantum computing may 
seem a distant concern, there are some important reasons 
why the problem of PQC migration has urgency to many 
organizations, industries, and governments worldwide: 
◗  Uncertain QC development timeline,
◗  Complex PQC migration requirements,
◗  Record now, exploit later attacks, and
◗  Relevance to NIST standards selection.
First is risk stemming from an uncertain quantum 
computing development timeline that leaves open 
the possibility of faster advancements than originally 
anticipated. NIST’s 2017 PQC call for proposals notes the 
“noticeable progress in the development of quantum 
computers” as a key motivation for initiating the standards 
process, including “theoretical techniques for quantum 
error correction and fault-tolerant quantum computation, 
and experimental demonstrations of physical qubits and 
entangling operations in architectures that have the 
potential to scale up to larger systems.” [19] 
A second concern is the time and complexity of PQC 
migration which implies the need for considerable lead 
time before scaled QCs are available. NIST acknowledges 
this as well, stating in their PQC call for proposals that 
“a transition to post-quantum cryptography will not 
be simple as there is unlikely to be a simple ‘drop-in’ 
replacement for our current public-key cryptographic 
algorithms.” [19] This situation is further exacerbated in 
embedded environments and other settings dependent 
on cryptographic hardware. For instance, the chief of 
computer security at NIST remarked that “cryptographic 
agility is critical for small satellite security.”[35] Such 
systems are hard to modify and are known for long-lived 
deployments. 
Third is concern over the possibility of “record now, 
exploit later” (also known as “harvest now, decrypt later”) 
in which an adversary captures encrypted versions of 
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long-lived private information assets (e.g., social security 
numbers, critical business information) for attack later 
when quantum computers become available. The threat 
implies the critical need for quantum safe protections 
within industry and government for long-lived information 
assets well in advance of a fully implemented threat.
Finally, there is an important need to explore PQC 
migration considerations during NIST’s standardization 
process which is in full swing at the time of this writing. 
Research will inform NIST’s evaluation of PQC proposals 
and help to ensure that practical standards and parameter 
guidelines are selected.
1.3 The Need for Research 
The complex challenge of migrating our global compute 
infrastructure to new public-key cryptography standards 
will involve work on many levels, and we argue that the 
area overall is in dire need of research. That is, before 
the global industry ecosystem can deploy quantum 
safe solutions, there is considerable work to be done 
understanding migration challenges and schemes, 
and more rigorously addressing integration, security, 
performance, agility, and other challenges. The research 
community, known for its analytic rigor and freedom to 
explore, is uniquely positioned to contribute in this space. 
In particular, an interdisciplinary collaboration between 
cryptography, applied cryptography, and system security 
researchers is needed to understand this new and cross-
cutting domain.
On January 31-February 1, 2019, the Computing Community 
Consortium (CCC) held a workshop in Washington, D.C. to 
identify the many ways in which the research community 
could dramatically aid the complex challenge of a global 
transition to PQC standards. The workshop entitled, 
“Identifying Research Challenges in Post Quantum 
Cryptography Migration and Cryptographic Agility”, 
brought together participants from three related but 
distinct communities: cryptographers contributing to the 
NIST PQC standards effort, applied cryptographers with 
expertise in cryptography implementation and real-world 
applications, and industry practitioners with expertise in 
the deployment and usage of cryptographic standards in 
products and across compute infrastructures.
Discussion of research challenges focused on two 
overlapping domains: 
1.  Core PQC Migration Research. Research that addresses 
the application of candidate algorithms to specific contexts 
and how migration within any given cryptographic usage 
domain can be realized in a secure way. 
2.  Toward a Science of Cryptographic Agility. Research 
here looks at the notion of “cryptographic agility”, or the 
ability to migrate to new cryptographic algorithms and 
standards in an ongoing way. 
In many ways, cryptographic agility represents the 
generalization of PQC migration in that it considers 
not just the current challenge of migrating from our 
current algorithms to PQC alternatives, but the longer-
term need for ongoing migrations as new attacks and 
better algorithms motivate the need for updates in our 
cryptographic standards. As will be discussed in Section 3, 
there is an important need to develop a principled science 
of cryptographic agility; one that broadens and expands the 
scope of agility to that of developing secure frameworks 
that enable ongoing cryptographic advancements in a 
wide variety of system, protocol, and application contexts. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between PQC migration 
and cryptographic agility. We envision the larger space 
of PQC migration and cryptographic agility challenges 
to partially overlap. The overlap of concerns represents 
the space of challenges in which agility frameworks 
will be needed to enable cryptographic migration to PQC 
algorithms. At the same time, there are PQC migration 
challenges that are specific to the algorithms and 
don’t involve cryptographic agility. Similarly, there are 
cryptographic agility challenges that are independent of 
PQC migration specifics.
The unique space of research opportunities is a subset 
of the overall challenges associated with PQC migration 
and cryptographic agility. This acknowledges the role 
of software solution providers, hardware vendors, 
government standards bodies, international consortiums, 
the open source developer community, and others who 
will contribute to implementing migration and agility at 
many levels. The challenges we are concerned with here 
5are the parts of the overall content landscape that would 
benefit from the empirical rigor, analysis of fundamentals, 
and exploratory approaches characteristic of research.
2. Core PQC Migration Challenges
The need for research in PQC migration begins with the 
need to understand the many contexts in which transition 
to new PQC algorithms will occur, and the problem of how 
migration will be implemented. This includes the problem 
of obsoleting deprecated algorithms, something that is 
surprisingly hard within a complicated world of deeply 
entrenched deployments and frameworks with little or no 
support for phased retirement.
By way of background, the five key families of PQC 
algorithms are shown in Figure 3. Algorithm families 
address three fundamental applications of public key 
cryptography: encryption, key encapsulation mechanisms 
(KEMs), and digital signatures. As NIST emphasizes in 
their 2016 CFP, it’s important to understand that migrating 
our public key cryptography infrastructure to PQC 
alternatives will not be a simple “drop-in” replacement 
exercise for several reasons. First, PQC algorithms offer 
significantly different key sizes, ciphertext sizes, signature 
sizes, communication requirements, and computational 
requirements including both memory and compute. Second, 
many algorithms introduce new requirements (e.g., state 
management, entropy) that will demand modifications to 
existing frameworks. (Section 2.1 will discuss these issues 
in greater detail.)
Finally, NIST has indicated that there is relatively little 
chance that a single algorithm will be selected as the 
replacement. This is because different algorithms offer 
different trade-offs in, for example, keys size and compute 
requirements, and options are needed to cover a wide 
variety of device and usage contexts. It is also because 
there is naturally some uncertainty involved in quantum 
safe algorithm selection; the exact scope of quantum 
algorithms is not yet known, and the possibility of 
classical computing attacks is an ongoing issue for newly 
introduced algorithms that have not yet stood the test of 
time. All in all, NIST believes it is circumspect to provide 
several alternatives within the new PQC standard rather 
than forcing a one-size-fits-all solution.
Below we discuss several areas of PQC migration that 
could benefit from research.
2.1 PQC Algorithms: Charting Implications 
Across Domains
A core set of research challenges surrounds the need 
to understand and quantify the implications of replacing 
today’s public cryptography algorithms (e.g., RSA, ECDH, 
ECDSA, DSA) with PQC alternatives (see Figure 3) across a 
wide variety of implementation and deployment contexts.
As mentioned by NIST, there are significant differences 
between PQC and our widely deployed public key 
cryptography standards. Most obvious are increases in 
key, ciphertext, and signature sizes which many of our 
current usage domains are not prepared to accommodate. 
But additional differences in computation and memory 
requirements are just as significant, impacting 
implementation strategies, performance, system buffering 
dynamics, communication patterns, and side channel 
vulnerabilities. Many PQC algorithms further introduce new 
requirements including state management (hash-based 
signatures), auxiliary functions (e.g., Gaussian sampling 
Figure 2: The role of research in PQC migration and cryptographic agility.
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in lattices), entropy (e.g., lattice-based schemes), and 
nonzero decryption failure probabilities (e.g., code-based 
encryptions schemes). [6] How these considerations 
play themselves out for a wide variety of cryptography 
implementation and application domains represents a 
large open space of much-needed research. 
A non-exhaustive list of traditional cryptography usage 
domains for exploration includes:
◗  secure communication protocols (e.g., TLS, SSH, IPSec),
◗  digital signature schemes,
◗  public key infrastructure (PKI), 
◗  authentication protocols,
◗  identity and access management systems, and
◗  key management systems.
The space of cryptography usage domains can also be 
looked in a platform- and/or application-centric way. For 
example, research might consider how deploying PQC 
algorithms will impact:
◗  web-based computing,
◗  mobile computing,
◗  Internet of things (IoT) and edge computing,
◗  public, private, and hybrid clouds,
◗  virtual private networks, and
◗  trusted computing architectures.
In general, workshop participants pointed out the need 
for research to be highly experimental. Software and 
hardware test environments are needed to prototype 
and quantify experimentally what happens when PQC 
algorithms are deployed within a broad range of existing 
cryptography domains.
Performance Considerations
Given that PQC algorithms generally have greater 
computation, memory, storage, and communication 
requirements (e.g., larger key sizes, more complex 
algorithms, or both), research is needed to better 
understand and quantify performance considerations 
in a wide range of deployment contexts. Broadly, 
performance is a key industry concern, and an important 
set of challenges to be solved before PQC can be adopted 
in practice. 
Consider networking, for example. Larger key sizes imply 
changes to packetization and latency patterns within 
secure communication protocols like TLS. This in turn 
impacts a whole spectrum of network-related devices 
that have been optimized for our current cryptographic 
protocols in the interest of performance and scale – 
from network routers and switches to gateway devices, 
network appliances (e.g., firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, WAN accelerators), and content distribution 
schemes. How will packetization considerations impact 
network function virtualization in 5G cellular networks? 
What are the implications of new PQC communication 
patterns for end user devices like smart phones or end 
user applications like web browsers?
Figure 3: Families of PQC algorithms and key attributes [10]
PQC Algorithm Family Function/Use Examples Notable Attributes
Hash-based Cryptography Digital signatures XMSS, SPHINCS+ Well-understood. Stateful schemes needed 
to reduce large signature sizes. 
Lattice-based Cryptography KEM/Encryption, 
Digital signatures
FrodoKEM, NewHope, 
NTRU, FALCON, qTESLA
Short ciphertext and keys, good performance, 
sometimes complex. Short signatures.
Code-based Cryptography KEM/Encryption, BIKE, Classic McEliece, 
HQC, NTS-KEM, RQC
High confidence. Fast encryption but larger 
public keys.
Multivariate Cryptography Digital signatures EMSS, LUOV, MQDSS, 
Rainbow 
Large key sizes (~1 MB / ~11 KB). Schemes 
need more analysis
Supersingular Elliptic Curve 
Isogeny Cryptography
KEM/Encryption SIKE Very small key sizes (less than 500 B), 
slower performance, relatively new.
7Research could play a much-needed role in developing 
performance optimization approaches for specific PQC 
algorithms. Where are the key bottlenecks for a given 
algorithm, and what frameworks might be developed to 
address them? Examples include new ways to exercise 
parallelism, new data structures that improve memory 
access performance, or mathematical techniques that 
reorganize computation to better utilize an underlying 
compute architecture. Included in this research challenge 
is the need to understand performance in IoT device 
contexts where compute, memory, and battery constraints 
become first order considerations.
Techniques for making PQC more performant can also 
be applied to the challenge of hardware acceleration. 
FPGA-based research could be used to explore accelerator 
designs for key memory and computation bottlenecks in 
various families of PQC algorithms. As seen over time with 
AES and SHA-2, hardware primitives could be designed 
that lead to new instruction proposals for widely used 
computer and communication architectures. 
Security Considerations
Changes to the characteristics and requirements of our 
public key cryptography algorithms are more than just a 
matter of performance. They create new security issues 
in a variety of ways.
In contrast to well-understood RSA and ECC algorithms, 
less-understood PQC candidates have a different set of 
trade-offs in configurable parameters such as key size, 
ciphertext size, and computation time. Furthermore, specific 
algorithms add new “knobs”; for instance, dimensions in 
lattice schemes or code length and dimensions in code-
based schemes (e.g., Classic McEliece). A key challenge 
exists in understanding the tradeoffs between security 
and algorithm requirements for a wide variety of usage 
domains. These tradeoffs are unlikely to be addressed 
fully by NIST who cannot consider all contexts of PQC 
algorithm usage. While NIST will standardize schemes 
with specific parameter settings, guidelines on selecting 
algorithms among multiple options, and on security levels 
for specific usage contexts will be needed. Research may 
also lead to parameter adjustments over time.
Another area of much-needed research is in the 
cryptanalysis of PQC algorithms across a wide variety 
of protocols contexts. In cryptanalysis, researchers look 
for weaknesses in a cryptographic scheme under various 
assumptions and adversary models, and ultimately what 
it takes for a given cryptographic scheme to be broken. 
Research is needed on threat models in the context of 
specific PQC algorithms. Cryptanalysis could include 
both analytic components (e.g., careful investigation of 
underlying hardness assumptions and how they are 
mapped to real-world implementations) and practical 
components (e.g., strategies for attacking a scheme using 
statistical means or examining the security impact of a 
weak entropy source).
An important cryptanalysis challenge is that of side 
channel vulnerabilities or information leaks surrounding 
specific hardware architectures. In general, individual PQC 
algorithms will introduce new patterns of memory usage, 
timing, communications, cache behavior, failure modes, 
and more. How these patterns can be used by an adversary 
for timing attacks, memory-based attacks, differential 
fault analysis, speculative execution attacks, and other 
types of side channel attacks is an open question. Work is 
needed that examines such possibilities (and mitigations) 
for a broad spectrum of hardware platforms, from multi-
socket servers to widely used end user devices to rapidly 
proliferating IoT devices. 1
Implementation Considerations
The implementation of cryptography, whether in software 
or hardware, is notoriously more difficult than it appears. 
In part, this reflects the complexity of mathematical 
algorithms, which are a common source of errors. More 
fundamentally, however, it reflects the difficulty in 
translating mathematical algorithms to platform-specific 
architectures and device contexts. For example, the details 
of data representation and layout, and its interactions 
with a system’s memory hierarchy and operating system 
buffering mechanisms, can introduce vulnerabilities that 
are not apparent within cryptographic algorithm design. 
Given these complexities, there is an important need for 
research exploring the implementation of PQC algorithms 
1 The IoT space, in particular, suffers from the pernicious synergy of great cost-sensitivity, attachment to physical devices, diffcult-to-manage embedded 
interfaces, and insufficient security incentives for vendors.
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across a broad range of devices, computer architectures, 
system software stacks, and programming languages. 
A particularly challenging context of implementation is 
that of embedded systems. Devices in this domain are 
constrained in memory size, compute resources, and 
power availability since battery lifetimes are finite. PQC 
implementations are needed to understand how specific 
algorithms can navigate such constraints, and how 
hardware-software boundaries should be defined to help. 
Since IoT devices are physically exposed to adversarial 
tampering, how can implementations help to guard 
against side channel attacks in various ways? Which PQC 
approaches, and which parameter choices, are well- or 
poorly-matched with devices in this domain?
Note that existing reference code associated with NIST PQC 
submissions is often not ready for real-world use within 
industry contexts and, while optimized implementations 
were additionally submitted, there is an important need 
for further research on optimization and performance. An 
important outcome of research could be a common set of 
robustly implemented, optimized software libraries (e.g., 
within Open Quantum Safe [32]) to support experimentation 
and performance characterization on specific platforms 
and using specific programming language runtimes.
2.2 Migration Frameworks: How will we  
get there?
Migration from today’s widely used public key cryptography 
algorithms to PQC replacements is not merely about 
the algorithms. Another much-needed area of research 
surrounds the approaches used to introduce new 
algorithms within systems that must operate continuously 
and remain interoperable with other systems that may be 
ahead or behind on the migration curve.
One widely discussed approach to introducing migration is 
that of hybrid schemes. In this approach, two cryptographic 
algorithms are applied, one from our current canon of 
standards (e.g., RSA or ECC) and one from the newer array 
of PQC alternatives (e.g., lattices). Hybrids provide a way to 
introduce quantum safety to address “record now, exploit 
later” while still relying on well-understood resistance 
to classical attacks. This is especially important during 
initial periods of PQC deployment since confidence in 
the robustness of newly introduced algorithms and 
implementations takes time to build. An example can 
be seen in X.509v3 digital certificates which support an 
option enabling embedded extensions. [16] The option can 
be used to embed a PQC public key and signature within 
a digital certificate using conventional standards. A nice 
feature of “hybrid modes” of cryptography usage is that 
an organization can retain certification (e.g., NIST FIPS 
140) during the period of transition to newer candidate 
standards. A drawback, of course, is that computation, 
memory, communication, and other requirements are 
significantly increased. It was noted by workshop 
participants that migration to PQC alternatives may, in 
fact, involve two migrations: one to hybrid schemes and a 
subsequent migration from hybrid schemes to standalone 
PQC algorithms. This likely future further underscores the 
need for cryptographic agility which will be discussed at 
length in Section 3.
Some research on hybrid schemes has been carried out, 
specifically in the context of key exchange protocols.[30,31] 
Hybrid schemes are related to cryptographic research on 
combiners. Hash combiners construct a new hash function 
from two component hash functions and exhibit robust 
security if at least one of them is secure. [17] Encryption 
combiners, used with identity-based encryption schemes, 
take public keys from component encryption schemes and 
create a combined public key. [15] Work on combiners, to 
our knowledge, has not been applied more specifically 
to PQC algorithms and represents an important area 
of future work. For instance, a better understanding of 
combiners and key derivation functions (KDFs) is needed 
for deploying hybrid schemes. 
Another approach to migration is cipher suite negotiation 
as seen in IETF protocols like TLS. [18] A list of supported 
cipher suites is presented by interacting parties during 
the protocol’s initial handshake phase in order to select 
the most robust option that both support. The negotiation 
may include cipher suite version numbers and additional 
information on key sizes and parameter settings. [14] Using 
this framework, new PQC algorithms could be added as 
cipher suite options and deprecated algorithms removed. 
As will be mentioned later in section 3.1, downgrade 
attacks are a concern in this approach.
9In general, while practical schemes exist and are even 
being discussed by some standards bodies, there is a 
need for research to examine migration frameworks 
more creatively and more rigorously. For each domain and 
platform type, what new migration approaches could be 
developed to support the transition to new PQC algorithms 
without loss of interoperability and functionality during 
the transition period? What is the attack surface and risk 
profile associated with each approach? 
A key problem for any migration scheme is that of legacy 
systems. How can systems that are not designed to be 
migrated make the transition to PQC algorithms? Examples 
include legacy IoT devices that are no longer supported 
by a manufacturer or legacy system software that is no 
longer actively being developed or supported. Since public 
key cryptography involves the secure interoperability of 
systems, how should a migrated system interact with 
a legacy system in a quantum safe manner? Are there 
frameworks that can be applied transparently to protocols 
or systems that lack inherent migration mechanisms? 
What options exist for adding PQC to systems that cannot 
be field-upgraded?
Many workshop participants also noted the problem of 
algorithm deprecation. Prior cryptographic migration 
efforts have shown that eliminating deprecated algorithms 
(e.g., RC4, MD5, SHA1, DES and TripleDES) from active use is 
harder than it appears. Legacy systems, legacy versions 
of cryptographic libraries, lack of security oversight within 
an organization, and many other factors contribute to this. 
The research question to be addressed is how algorithm 
deprecation can be “designed in” to a migration scheme to 
ensure deprecated algorithms don’t operate in perpetuity.
Finally, workshop participants pointed out the need for 
research to address the problem of when migration to 
PQC should occur. While timeline discussions often look to 
the current state of QC prototype development, this fails 
to account for the complexities of migration and the chain 
of dependencies between research, standards bodies, 
hardware platform providers, software solution providers, 
open source libraries, system software stacks, industry 
certification frameworks, and more. Research on risk 
management could be part of investigations in this arena.
Formal Modeling
An area of much-needed research is formal modeling 
of cryptographic migration. While industry can build 
migration schemes, whether hybrid or combiner-based 
or negotiation-based or something else, it remains an 
open question whether the presumed security has the 
robustness that is expected. Formal methods can help 
to address this question for a given scheme in a more 
fundamental manner and leveraging analytic techniques 
that researchers are uniquely positioned to apply. 
For example, consider the need for formal modeling of 
hybrid and combiner schemes. While the intuition is 
that they are no weaker than the strongest underlying 
component algorithm, can we be sure they don’t introduce 
vulnerabilities compared to a non-hybrid use of the 
strongest underlying algorithm? What are the attack 
surfaces associated with specific hybrid instantiations 
for key encapsulation mechanisms, encryption schemes, 
and digital signatures? What do formal models tell us 
about the level of security for common misuses or flawed 
implementations? How are adversaries to be modeled 
under a variety of assumptions?
Formal modeling is also needed for examining the 
security of inserting migration frameworks into common 
cryptographic protocols. An important example is the 
widely used TLS protocol which could be carefully divided 
into classical and quantum resistant components for 
analysis. Other protocols include key exchange (Diffie-
Helman), key management (KMIP), public key infrastructure 
(PKI), secure communication (IPSec, SSH), secure web or 
mail applications (HTTPS, S/MIME), signature applications 
(MAC, PGP, CMS), identity management (SAML, OpenID), 
virtual private networks (VPNs), and more.
Automated Tools
Workshop participants pointed out that the extensiveness 
of our cryptographic infrastructure makes migration nearly 
unachievable without automated tools. As such, there is 
an important need for research to address this issue in a 
variety of spheres.
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One important challenge is identifying where public key 
cryptography is being used in an organization’s complex 
IT infrastructure and which algorithms and versions are 
deployed. While this may seem simple, the challenge 
speaks to how complex and multi-layered our uses of public 
key cryptography are. Large organizations may leverage 
hundreds of software packages and develop many more. 
Application binaries may have chains of dependencies that 
extend to third party application providers who in turn use 
third party component libraries, cryptographic modules, 
operating system APIs, vender-specific device driver 
libraries, and so on. Research could help to develop active 
and passive approaches to scanning an infrastructure and 
provide an analysis of legacy cryptography usage based 
on network traffic, open ports, end user devices, system 
binaries, source code repositories, and more. 
Automation is also needed for analyzing PQC migration 
mechanisms inserted into protocols, specifications, and 
source code. Application source code, for example, is 
often too large for manual scanning and too complex 
for programmer analysis. Automated tools could trace 
dependencies, identify runtime control flow, probe for 
common vulnerabilities, and verify the security of new 
PQC libraries and migration mechanisms. Because of 
the strong association with formal modeling, once again 
researchers are uniquely suited to advance the state-of-
the-art in this sphere. 
Automated testing tools are sorely needed to test PQC 
migration mechanisms, and to explore cryptographic 
failure modes, whether PQC algorithm specific or migration 
framework-based. Forward-looking automation research 
could develop frameworks for synthesizing migration and 
validation code, inserting test cases into the developer 
toolchain, modifying binary images for legacy software, 
and so on.
Complex Infrastructures
Very little research has been done in understanding PQC 
migration challenges in complex compute infrastructures 
like private data centers, public cloud, hybrid and federated 
architectures, edge computing, smart home or building 
environments, and more. Such infrastructures not only 
exhibit architectural complexity, they deepen the layering 
of our system software stacks and add heterogeneity.
Workshop participants pointed to the need for research 
on the software stack implications of PQC migration. While 
migration may seem as simple as changing a library at a 
single layer in the stack, in fact, there are often implicit 
dependencies that introduce complexities. For example, 
digital certificates may be parsed at the application layer, 
cryptographic keys may be managed by an infrastructure 
management agent, or network security mechanisms 
may be tuned to particular packet sequences for a given 
cryptographic protocol. Research is needed to develop 
mechanisms that allow a better understanding of such 
cross-layer dependencies.
Research is also needed on infrastructure-level 
abstractions and frameworks for addressing PQC 
migration. Given a complex web of migration domains, 
which are the most important and what might a priority 
ordering look like? Which key dependencies would result 
in the greatest impact if they were migrated first? In 
general, how might we model the migration of an entire 
infrastructure? How should migration auditing work, 
and how might we construct evidence of end-to-end 
quantum safety? What tools might identify and address 
infrastructure-level vulnerabilities and failures?
On a macro level, research will be needed in the future 
on how to measure the state of PQC migration across 
a geographic region of the Internet, or even the global 
Internet itself. Methodology and tools do not currently exist.
2.3 Case Study: Authentication Using PQC
Workshop participants pointed out that one of the biggest 
challenges in migrating to PQC alternatives is that of 
authentication. Today’s digital signatures standards, 
as defined by NIST [20], include DSA, RSA, and ECDSA 
algorithms, which, for a security level of 112 bits, offer key 
sizes of 2048, 2048, or 224 bits respectively [33]. Algorithms 
are generally fast and efficient, particularly ECDSA which 
reduces both key size and computation requirements.
Finding a quantum safe alternative for these widely 
deployed signature algorithms illustrates some of the 
complexities that could benefit from research on PQC 
migration. Multivariate signatures schemes (e.g., Rainbow 
[23]) offer small signature sizes, but large public and 
private keys (e.g., 500-700KB) and significantly more 
computation for key generation and signature operations. 
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Lattice-based schemes (e.g., CRYSTALS-Dilithium [24]) offer 
key sizes that are roughly equivalent to DSA and RSA, but 
still require significantly more computation for signatures. 
Hash-based signatures, another quantum safe alternative, 
were proposed in the 1970s [25] and offer well-understood 
security under comparatively few assumptions. However, 
they introduce the new complexity of statefulness since 
one-time signatures require that a secret key not be used 
twice. To solve the problem of large public key sizes, hash 
trees (i.e., Merkle Trees [26]) can be used to generate a 
large number of pre-computed keys of small size for 
signature use. Now, however, users of the scheme 
need to securely store and manage the private keys 
associated with such trees, a consideration that makes 
migration from DSA or ECDSA challenging. While stateless 
hash-based PQC alternatives are being considered (e.g., 
SPHINCS+ [27]), keys sizes are much larger. [6] 
The implications of these ins and outs to a broad range 
of authentication applications remains an open question 
to be explored by researchers. On the one hand, it’s 
unclear how larger storage, memory, and communications 
requirements will impact various domains if stateless 
algorithms are chosen. (Consider, for example, IoT 
devices.) On the other hand, stateful schemes change 
the requirements of cryptography usage dramatically, 
necessitating new implementation schemes to deal 
with one-time key pairs and to avoid attacks directed 
at key reuse. Workshop participants pointed out that 
stateful schemes (e.g., XMSS [28]), despite some appealing 
properties, would appear to be a poor match for many 
distributed computing scenarios, usage contexts that 
emphasize resilience, and hardware-based security 
schemes. Even use with PKI certificate schemes would 
seem difficult.
3. A New Science of Cryptographic 
Agility
The challenge of migrating our public key cryptography 
to quantum safe alternatives naturally raises broader 
questions about the very frameworks we use to deploy 
and configure cryptography across the global Internet. 
How amenable are our systems to changes in cryptography 
over time as algorithms, implementations, and standards 
continue to evolve? 
Many have pointed out the widespread problem of 
security solutions that fail to comprehend and provision 
for the full lifecycle of cryptographic algorithms. A given 
cryptography standard may be revised over time as 
advances in technology weaken the strength of once 
accepted key sizes and other configuration parameters. 
New algorithms may be introduced in response to 
vulnerabilities or as more efficient alternatives become 
available. Standards may become deprecated and need to 
be eliminated in a phased or sometimes immediate way. 
[21] Algorithm elimination is a particularly notable failure in 
the industry as long-deprecated standards (e.g., RC4, MD5, 
DES) continue to be in use.
In the context of PQC, NIST’s Lidong Chen points out in 
a 2017 IEEE Security and Privacy article [6] that new QC 
algorithms could be discovered in the future that lead 
to attacks on PQC algorithms thought to be quantum 
resistant. In fact, the performance characteristics and 
algorithmic techniques of tomorrow’s QCs are open to 
debate as the limits of quantum computing are not yet 
known. This creates an unavoidable uncertainty in the 
longevity of upcoming PQC standards. Adi Shamir adds 
that NIST’s PQC standards process should simultaneously 
comprehend the need for near-term solutions that are 
production ready, schemes that offer improvements but 
require further analysis and vetting, and longer-term 
research on new families of algorithms that could offer 
superior robustness and provability.[7]
Even NIST’s current work on PQC standardization is 
expected to lead to several alternatives for use with 
encryption, key encapsulation, and digital signatures.
[19] As mentioned in section 2, this is because different 
algorithms offer different trade-offs in key and 
ciphertext sizes, compute requirements, communications 
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overhead, and so on, and options are needed to cover 
a wide variety of device and usage contexts. Over time, 
additional algorithms, parameter recommendations, and 
implementation options may become available for a given 
set of technical requirements. Change will be needed in 
many dimensions. 
Given these considerations, we believe the industry 
challenge of cryptographic migration should be understood 
as a broader challenge of cryptographic agility; the 
question is not how should we transition to a new set of 
standards, but how should we transition to architectures 
that offer agility for ongoing cryptographic migrations 
over time? Cryptographic agility addresses the important 
problem of future-proofing our global cryptographic 
infrastructure in a flexible and robust manner.
Surprisingly, traditional notions of “cryptographic agility” 
within the research community invoke a fairly narrow set 
of concerns surrounding algorithm implementation; that 
component algorithms within an implementation should 
be replaceable, something readily addressable through 
engineering best practices. While an important point in 
systems engineering, we believe this limited view fails to 
comprehend the larger picture of agility challenges facing 
our global cryptographic infrastructure. In fact, this minor 
implementation challenge should be recast as a major 
design challenge; and one that is a key opportunity for 
the industry as it moves to replace deeply entrenched 
standards with newer PQC alternatives.
A key contribution of the CCC workshop, then, is to call 
out the need for broadening and recasting the scope of 
cryptographic agility in light of the size and complexity 
of global PQC migration challenge. Could there be a 
principled science of cryptographic agility that more 
rigorously considers a broad spectrum of frameworks, 
a robust analysis of correctness and security, a deeper 
understanding of attack surfaces, and an exploration of 
domain-specific (e.g., protocol, application, system) issues? 
We outline what we see to be the research issues below.
3.1 Definitions, Goals, and Scope
What should an expanded and more rigorous science of 
cryptographic agility (CA) consist of? We believe there is 
an important need for the research community to redefine 
the scope of CA in several dimensions, which we describe 
in this section. The challenge here is to adjust our 
traditional notions of CA to better comprehend the scale 
and complexity of cryptography usage in the wild across 
our global Internet.
As a first step, workshop participants pointed out the 
need to define a broad set of goals to guide advancement 
of the field. While the list is an open research question to 
be addressed, some illustrative examples include: 
◗  Effectiveness. CA must be demonstrably effective in 
facilitating cryptographic migration.
◗  Measurability. The level of CA can be clearly assessed 
for any given algorithm or implementation.  
◗  Interpretability. CA requirements and techniques can be 
applied across a range of cryptography contexts. 
◗  Enforceability. CA techniques are well-specified and can 
be mandated for specific cryptography contexts.
◗  Security. CA approaches are secure against attacks of 
various types.
◗  Performance. Overheads caused by CA are well-
understood and within acceptable limits.
A second step would be an expanded notion of the compute 
domains over which CA frameworks will be applied. The 
range of contexts should be comprehensive in addressing 
the universe of compute domains within which we deploy 
and use cryptography in practice. One way to look at such 
contexts is as a hierarchy of expanding scope; how might 
agility be defined over the following units of cryptography 
usage:
◗  An algorithm (e.g., key encapsulation mechanisms), 
◗  A unit of program code (e.g., an authentication function), 
◗  A protocol (e.g., TLS), 
◗  An application (e.g., an email or web server), 
◗  A service (e.g., an online banking portal), 
◗  A system (e.g., an operating system or IoT device),
◗  A distributed compute infrastructure (e.g., an enterprise),
13
◗  A cloud hosting service (e.g., public and/or private cloud), 
or
◗  A complex vertical domain (e.g., a smart building)? 
A third step in broadening the scope of CA is to comprehend 
modalities of “agility” beyond simple algorithmic agility. 
Workshop participants suggested the following additions:
Modality Scope
Implementation Agility Application interfaces and policy configuration frameworks facilitate migration across 
implementations.
Compliance Agility Cryptographic infrastructure can be reconfigured to address compliance requirements for 
varying international regulations and frameworks, or to minimize a trusted computing base 
(TCB)
Security Strength Agility Many PQC algorithms require different implementations for different security strengths. 
Algorithms that dynamically ascale security strength based on configuration provide better 
agility
Migration Agility The ability to move automatically from one scheme to another - including conversion. 
Requires better use of cryptographic metadata at the level of application data.
  Retirement Agility The ability to enforce the retirement of obsoleted or insecure cryptographic algorithms.
Composability Agility The ability to combine cryptographic building blocks in a secure way. 
Platform agility The ability to use assured cryptographic algorithms across different platform types. 
Context Agility The cryptographic algorithm and strength policy should ideally have the flexibility to be 
derived automatically from system attributes such as data classification and data location.
Figure 4: Possible modalities of an expanded notion of cryptographic agility.
A fourth step is to consider a broader range of time scales 
over which CA approaches will be applied. Coarse-grained 
approaches might consider the problem of migrating 
a hardware device or cloud infrastructure from one 
cryptographic standard to another in a phased way while 
ensuring continuous operation throughout. Fine-grained 
approaches, on the other hand, might address the problem 
of selecting a cryptographic standard instantaneously 
during a configuration sequence or as part of a session-
based negotiation between communication endpoints. 
The latter might include CA schemes that let us switch 
cryptographic algorithms in real-time or almost real-
time at any point of our operations. Broadly, CA research 
should address the need for agility across a range of time 
horizons and include time interval explicitly as a first order 
design parameter.
Finally, a new and principled science of CA should mean 
expanding the range of research methodologies to include 
the full arsenal of computer science research. In other 
words, beyond engineering best practices looking at 
reconfigurability, research on CA should include formal 
analysis approaches that explore more fundamental 
properties of a given scheme, architectural approaches 
that consider hardware-software co-design alternatives, 
performance approaches that quantify the impact of CA 
for a given platform or architecture, systems approaches 
that examine the layering of CA mechanisms within a 
cloud or networking software stack, and more.
Frameworks
At the core of CA research are the frameworks and 
architectures that enable agility across a wide variety 
of computing contexts. What might such frameworks 
look like and what prior work might serve to bootstrap 
research in this domain? Overall, there is a notable 
scarcity of research in this area and work is needed to 
fill out the picture of potential approaches and to develop 
insights on what is possible. 
A review of existing work on agility frameworks might 
start with widely used cryptography libraries like OpenSSL, 
Bouncy Castle, and Oracle JCE, all of which offer industry-
ready implementations of cryptography standards and 
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software-based frameworks for selecting among them. It 
is reasonable to speculate that support for PQC algorithms 
will be added over time as NIST standards become 
available. However, it is important not to confuse the 
availability of cryptographic libraries with cryptographic 
agility; the problem lies in the manual effort required for 
developers to integrate new library options into existing 
software, and to deal with considerations as described in 
section 2.1 above. 
Hybrid cryptography schemes were mentioned in section 
2.2 as a way to migrate from one standard to another. 
Essentially, two cryptographic algorithms are applied, 
one from our current canon of standards (e.g., RSA or 
ECC) and one from the newer array of PQC alternatives 
(e.g., lattices) as a way to introduce quantum safety while 
still relying on well-understood resistance to classical 
attacks. X.509v3 digital certificates were cited as a 
canonical example. [16] Agility research using hybrids (and 
cryptographic combiners) might consider their role as 
building blocks within a larger framework that addresses 
ongoing transitions over time. Perhaps the approach could 
be applied to agility contexts with other time scales (e.g., 
session-based, short-term vulnerability response), and 
variants of the scheme could be developed to address 
performance overheads and resource requirements, two 
key drawbacks cited earlier.
The existing practice of cipher suite negotiation, as seen 
in IETF protocols like TLS [18], represents an important and 
widely used agility approach within the communication 
protocol domain, enough so to warrant an IETF RFC on 
the subject [14]. As described in section 2.2, a list of 
supported cipher suites is presented by interacting 
parties during the protocol’s initial handshake phase in 
order to select the most robust option that both support. 
The scheme addresses the need for session-based agility, 
and supports both the introduction and elimination 
of cryptographic algorithms. A principled science of 
cryptographic agility might provide a more robust 
analysis of the paradigm, including an analysis of attack 
surfaces (e.g., downgrade attacks). Could the approach 
be applicable beyond communication protocols? What 
happens when the approach is considered for a broader 
range of infrastructure and agility contexts?
We argue that the frameworks mentioned here, while 
important, represent a relatively small sampling of possible 
approaches and there is considerable opportunity for 
research to expand the range of alternatives. As described 
in section 3.1, CA considerations apply to a broad range of 
compute domains and modalities, encompassing a diverse 
set of requirements that is beyond what hybrids or cipher 
suite negotiation can deliver as approaches. For example, 
at the algorithmic level, how might agility be built into 
key exchange or message authentication algorithms in 
provably secure ways? At the infrastructure level, what is 
the architecture supporting cryptographic reconfiguration 
in a secure and auditable manner?
Interfaces
A companion research issue surrounding that of CA 
frameworks is the challenge of interfaces. What 
should the interface of a CA scheme, as presented to a 
programmer, a security administrator, a device owner, a 
service provider, a systems integrator, etc. look like? What 
level should cryptographic configurability be handled at, 
and what security mechanisms should be designed-in to 
protect the scheme?
Workshop participants pointed out the need to address 
both the syntax and semantics of an interface within the 
context of an agility scheme and its users. The interface 
should be amenable to formal analysis which can be used 
to assert provable security properties. It should also be 
amenable to testing and validation. 
An open question is that of abstractions. Research is 
needed to develop new user-facing abstractions for CA, and 
for studying the tradeoffs of different levels of abstraction 
for a given domain. How much flexibility should be offered 
and at what expense? Should multiple interfaces be offered 
for different user types? How should defaults be handled, 
something sorely needed for naïve users but known to 
cause problems over time as values become outdated or 
fail to align with a given context of use?
We note that little work has been done to explore the 
interface design space for cryptographic agility. Research 
is needed to develop design alternatives and insights 
on user behavior for a variety of cryptographic usage 
contexts. Meaningful paradigms should address a range 
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of users, from developers to security administrators to 
device manufacturers to auditors and more.
Security and Complexity Tradeoffs
An important concern and companion research issue in 
CA schemes is that of attack surfaces. It was mentioned 
in section 2.2 and 3.1.1 that IETF RFC 7696 (“Guidelines for 
Cryptographic Algorithm Agility and Selecting Mandatory-
to-Implement Algorithms”) [14] offers a protocol-centric 
view of CA, defining a successful realization to be 
“when a protocol can easily migrate from one algorithm 
suite to another more desirable one, over time”. The 
RFC describes numerous requirements for CA schemes, 
including standardized identifiers and version numbers for 
algorithm suites, specifications for which algorithms must 
be implemented, mandatory key sizes and parameter 
settings, integrity protections for algorithm negotiation, 
and more.
While CA as described may seem a panacea of sorts, 
a key concern mentioned in the RFC is that of added 
complexity and the corresponding opportunity it 
creates for attack. For instance, a well-known attack in 
negotiation-based protocol exchanges between endpoints 
is that of the downgrade attack in which a man-in-the-
middle adversary causes an endpoint to choose a less 
secure cryptographic suite option or even switch to an 
unprotected mode of communication by tampering with 
options during algorithm negotiation. Other weaknesses 
are created when less secure algorithm suites or less 
tested implementations are offered as options to enable 
interoperability. 
There is an important need for research on attack surfaces 
associated with CA schemes and interfaces. Workshop 
participants raised the question of whether “agility builds 
fragility” in cryptographic systems? Paul Kocher, at a 2016 
NAS Cyber Resilience Workshop on “Cryptographic Agility 
and Interoperability” underscored this point by stating, 
“Agility mechanisms introduce complexity, which leads to 
unknown consequences.” [22] 
What are the adversarial implications of introducing CA 
mechanisms, and how might these considerations guide 
the design of particular mechanisms? In a related point, 
workshop participants pointed out the need to prevent 
CA schemes from enabling bad algorithms and malicious 
implementations for a given usage domain.
Other Defining Challenges
Workshop participants mentioned a number of additional 
research challenges.
First is that of identifying the right areas within a 
cryptographic solution to insert agility. The science of CA 
should predict where future security problems could occur 
within a cryptographic protocol or system, and then design 
the system in a way that leverages agility as a solution 
“hook”. For instance, a potential weakness or vulnerability 
in a software solution could be componentized within the 
architecture and placed within a broader CA framework 
to allow the introduction of alternative components in 
the future. This approach to refactoring a system should, 
furthermore, encompass all aspects of cryptography, 
including configuration, management, logging, entropy 
sources, key management, key derivation, key distribution, 
and more. 
Another key issue is that of testing and validation. 
Workshop participants pointed out that CA schemes, 
regardless of their scope (e.g., an algorithm, a cloud 
infrastructure) should come with companion testing and 
validation designs. How do we safely test systems with 
a new cryptographic standard or library implementation 
that deprecates support for an older cryptosystem? What 
is the best way to build testing frameworks that allow 
developers to future-proof their cryptography usage 
should that library or device be required to migrate? 
Research in this area should include automated tools for 
checking and enforcing CA design goals.
Yet another issue is how to address CA in legacy devices 
and cryptosystems that are difficult or impossible to 
reconfigure. A showcase example is IoT devices that are 
no longer supported by their manufacturer, and compute 
platforms with algorithm-specific security features and 
instruction sets. In the software domain, the problem 
can be seen in legacy applications or system software 
distributions that lack CA hooks and/or are no longer 
supported. Could agility schemes be built that “wrap” 
legacy algorithms in updated alternatives or somehow 
insert agility into an existing architecture?
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3.2 Context Agility: A Research Vision
One way to explore research challenges in CA is to 
consider future visions that identify non-incremental 
leaps and longer-term goals for the field. We believe that 
context agility could provide one such vision.
The notion of context agility, as discussed by workshop 
participants, considers cryptographic agility frameworks 
that automatically select among algorithms and 
configurations based on their context of use. For 
example, a context-aware CA framework may use data 
classification (personally identifiable information vs. public 
data) or data location (within a protected campus network 
vs. public location) to drive algorithm and parameter 
choices, managing tradeoffs in specific ways. 
Context agility schemes might consider CA from a wide 
variety of perspectives. A context-aware scheme could 
choose the right set of algorithms and parameters 
for a particular regulatory environment, or based on 
the availability of country-specific algorithms. Context 
agility could be aware of the underlying device platform 
and make decisions that better comprehend available 
compute and communication resources and the state of 
the system. Context agility could be used at a variety of 
time scales, from session-based cipher suite selection to 
infrastructure migrations over larger time horizons.
An important opportunity is context-aware CA schemes 
that could address notorious problems surrounding the 
users of cryptography. One of these is the failure of users to 
configure cryptographic systems with the right algorithms 
and parameters, something they often don’t understand or 
ignore due to complexity or infrastructure scaling issues. 
Automatic selection of defaults (algorithms, security 
levels, key sizes, etc.) is a simple but important example. 
Another problem is that of cryptography evolution over 
time – introducing new algorithms, eliminating deprecated 
algorithms, altering parameters over time, managing new 
cryptography requirements, and so on.
Context agile schemes could also move the industry 
beyond CA frameworks that merely select among 
algorithms to a world in which agility frameworks 
help to deploy new cryptographic technologies and 
features. Given the right level of abstraction, a context-
aware scheme could be configured to recognize system 
requirements and select the right technology for a secure 
result. This might be particularly useful in situations where 
security requirements are unanticipated or introduce new 
requirements in an ongoing or unexpected way.
Context-aware CA frameworks could also provide an 
approach to recommending or auditing cryptography 
configurations. For example, a framework might 
recommend a regional (location-specific) configuration 
for service providers, assist IT departments with the 
configuration of a newly installed resource, advise a naïve 
user on cryptographic configuration for their home device, 
or provide guidance to an IT team on changes to their 
infrastructure relative to new regional requirements.
We believe that research is needed to explore the 
possibilities of self-configuring cryptography, a vision that 
could drive a new generation of cryptographic protections 
across a variety of infrastructure types and time scales.
4. Additional Research Directions
In this section, we discuss additional research challenges.
4.1 Policy, Process, People
While the technical challenges surrounding PQC migration 
and cryptographic agility are considerable, many workshop 
participants additionally pointed out that research is 
desperately needed to better understand people, process, 
and policy aspects of the problem. While technical 
solutions are essential, these determine whether or not 
adoption occurs at all and when.
An important challenge is how to create incentives for 
software vendors and developers to build cryptographic 
agility into their solution architectures. For development 
teams, time and effort spent on cryptography is like a 
tax — an overhead to be minimized or avoided because 
it lacks payoff. That is, unlike a new product or adding 
features to an existing product, cryptographic agility as a 
practice doesn’t translate to revenue for a product team 
and therefore doesn’t make economic sense in terms of 
time and effort investment. 
The role of government, customers, and the Internet 
marketplace more generally in creating the right incentives 
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is an important gap that could benefit from economic and 
policy research. For government, could cryptographic 
agility be incentivized through procurement policy or by 
early adoption programs within the context of myriad 
service environments? From a standards point of view, 
could existing FIPS-140 certification processes be modified 
to include cryptographic agility as a requirement for 
maintaining the certification of a cryptographic solution? 
What can government do to create the right incentives?
Workshop participants pointed out that adoption 
incentives within the industry often boil down to customer 
pressures; company priorities are often adjusted to 
directly reflect customer needs and requirements. As 
such, what possible frameworks could be developed to 
enable customer pressure on industry solution providers 
to include cryptographic agility in their products and 
services? More broadly and from a solution provider point 
of view, what do companies gain in the marketplace by 
having robust security and privacy? What are the right 
economic and policy frameworks to increase such gains 
in the marketplace?
Note that adoption of cryptographic agility in the 
manner being discussed here assumes that we have 
clear technical definitions and associated metrics for 
evaluating an implementation. Unfortunately, we currently 
have neither. An important research challenge is thus 
developing a clearer understanding of these notions and 
translating them to a more specific set of requirements 
that can be acted upon by the industry. 
Finally, how to incentivize PQC adoption (when the time is 
right) is a key open challenge and one that is complicated by 
the fact that the timetable will vary for different industries 
and entities. Must it be fear that motivates organizations to 
take action, much like “Y2K” motivated the industry during 
that era of history? Are there education components to the 
problem, or would they matter little without more tangible 
threat and compliance incentives? Note here the “record 
now, exploit later” threat in which encrypted data can be 
captured and stored by an adversary now for attack later 
when scaled QCs become available.
What kind of services might be a good match for early 
deployment of PQC? Are there services that could be 
offered for free as a way of bootstrapping industry 
adoption? For example, workshop participants imagined 
a fictitious “Let’s Encrypt” campaign offering free hybrid 
certificates for use by Internet browser providers.
4.2 Frontiers of Cryptography
In addition to conventional cryptography use cases, 
workshop participants also discussed research challenges 
associated with emerging areas of cryptography. Below is 
a list of key areas.
◗  Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC). MPC enables 
multiple parties to jointly compute the output of a 
function over private data sets in a way that maintains 
the secrecy of input data and ensures correctness even 
if adversarial parties collude and attempt to attack the 
protocol in various ways. MPC is also referred to as 
privacy-preserving computation.
◗  Identity-based Encryption / Attribute-based Encryption 
(IBE/ABE). In IBE, a unique set of information about the 
identity of a user (e.g., email address) is used in place of 
a conventional public key. The recipient of an encrypted 
message then uses a trusted central authority to 
obtain a decryption key. ABE schemes constrain the 
ability of user to decrypt a message using attributes 
(e.g., organizational role, service tier). In other words, a 
message is encrypted using a set of attributes and can 
be decrypted only by a user who holds the private key 
matching the attribute formula. The scheme also makes 
use of a trusted party. [13]
◗  Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). Homomorphic 
encryption protects the privacy of data by enabling 
computation directly on ciphertexts allowing, for 
example, private data to be outsourced for processing 
in cloud computing or third party service contexts. 
While partially homomorphic encryption techniques 
constrain the scope and nature of computation allowed, 
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) supports arbitrary 
computation on ciphertexts but at the expense of more 
substantial computing requirements.
◗  Password-authenticated Key Agreement (PAKE). A PAKE 
protocol enables interacting parties to authenticate 
each other and derive a shared cryptographic key using 
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a one or more party’s knowledge of a password. The 
two parties prove possession of a shared password, 
but without revealing it or transmitting it over the 
insecure channel. As such, it protects against brute 
force dictionary attacks from eavesdroppers. [12]
◗  Blockchain. Blockchains offer an approach to 
implementing an immutable and distributed digital 
ledger, characteristically with no central repository and 
no central authority. Blockchains make extensive use of 
cryptographic hashing to create digests for transaction 
blocks, and public key cryptography to digitally sign 
them and to protect pseudonymity.
◗  Threshold Cryptography. In threshold cryptography, a 
private key is split and shared across multiple parties 
who are then able to reconstruct the key from a threshold 
number of participants who must cooperate to decrypt 
a message. The approach protects the secrecy of the 
private key and can be broadly applied: enabling digital 
signatures without a single party holding the entire 
signing key, performing encryption and decryption even 
if one component of the key becomes compromised, and 
more. [11]
One key open question is how PQC migration and 
cryptographic agility will apply to each approach. For 
example, how might cryptographic agility be added to 
blockchains, which are not designed for it? How will 
blockchain implementations navigate migration from RSA-
based signatures, DSA, and ECDSA to PQC alternatives? One 
interesting observation is that many of the techniques are 
not yet widely deployed which means they can be agile 
with new features. 
A second open question is whether any of these 
cryptographic technologies can help with the problem 
of cryptographic agility and PQC migration. For example, 
blockchain might be used to create a certificate ledger 
which manages certificates in use in an open, distributed, 
and secure way. Blockchain, and perhaps other schemes, 
might provide anchors of trust for both migration and 
agility challenges in various ways.
5. Conclusions
As quantum computing continues to make advancements 
in qubit technologies, scaling architectures, algorithms, 
applications, software tools, and more, it simultaneously 
fuels the urgency for a major transition in cryptography 
across the Internet as we know it today. At the time 
of this writing, NIST is actively leading an international 
community effort to select new public key cryptography 
algorithms for standardization to replace widely used RSA, 
ECDSA, ECDH, and DSA which are known to be vulnerable 
to attack by scaled quantum computing. Referred to as 
post-quantum cryptography, or PQC, these new algorithms 
use mathematical frameworks with no known mapping to 
quantum algorithms and are thus regarded as quantum 
resistant or quantum safe.
While NIST’s much-needed standardization initiative 
addresses the selection of new cryptographic algorithms, 
there is an urgent need to consider the complex problem 
of migration from today’s widely deployed algorithms to 
PQC alternatives. Underlying the explosive growth of the 
Internet and the “digitization” of nearly every sector of our 
society are security and privacy technologies that depend 
heavily on our current public key cryptography algorithms. 
The extensiveness of cryptography usage across the 
Internet means that an industry-wide migration to 
quantum safe cryptography standards (i.e., PQC) will be a 
massive undertaking, and one that is complicated by the 
layered complexity and heterogeneity of the worldwide 
compute infrastructure we operate. Prior history shows 
cryptographic migrations (e.g., 3DES to AES, MD5 to SHA1, 
SHA1 to SHA2, RSA to ECC) to take a decade or more before 
achieving broad success.
On January 31-February 1, 2019, the Computing Community 
Consortium (CCC) held a workshop in Washington, D.C. to 
discuss research challenges associated with PQC migration. 
Participants from three distinct yet related communities, 
cryptographers, contributing to the NIST PQC standards 
effort, applied cryptographers with expertise in creating 
cryptographic solutions and implementing cryptography 
in real-world settings, and industry practitioners with 
expertise in deploying cryptographic standards within 
products and compute infrastructures, came together to 
discuss research challenges surrounding PQC migration 
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and cryptographic agility. Participants agreed that 
challenges will require essential contributions by the 
research community who is uniquely positioned to explore 
new approaches and advance our understanding through 
empirical rigor, analysis of fundamentals, investigation of 
complex tradeoffs, and more.
Based on workshop discussion, the recommendations are 
as follows:
There is a need for research to understand and quantify 
the implications of replacing today’s public cryptography 
algorithms with PQC alternatives across a wide variety 
of implementation and deployment contexts. PQC 
candidate algorithms generally have greater computation, 
memory, storage, and communication requirements 
which imply the need to better understand performance, 
security, and implementation considerations. Research is 
needed on approaches to introducing new PQC algorithms 
(e.g., hybrids) within live systems that must remain 
interoperable with other systems during the period of 
industry migration. This includes such areas as formal 
modeling, automated tools, and approaching transition in 
complex infrastructures.
While “cryptographic agility” is a familiar notion within 
the cryptography research community, there is a need 
to broaden and recast its scope in light of the size and 
complexity of global PQC migration. A new science of 
cryptographic agility should include an expanded set of 
goals, a more comprehensive set of compute domains, 
a broader range of agility modalities and time scales, 
and the full range of security and computer science 
research methodologies. Research on cryptographic 
agility should include frameworks and architectures that 
enable agility across a wide variety of compute contexts, 
usable interfaces addressing various user roles, a better 
understanding of security and complexity tradeoffs, and 
other defining challenges. Context agility, or cryptographic 
frameworks that automatically select among algorithms 
and configuration based on the context of use, represents 
a long-term research vision that could shape the field. 
An important but overlooked area of research is social 
and policy aspects of cryptographic migration and agility. 
In fact, policy, process, and people determine whether and 
when PQC adoption occurs at all. How should incentives 
be created for software developers and vendors to build 
cryptographic agility into their solution architectures? How 
might the role of government, customers, and the Internet 
marketplace contribute to creating the right incentives? 
Finally, research is also needed on the frontiers of 
cryptography; that is, how PQC migration and cryptographic 
agility will apply to newer cryptography fields like secure 
multi-party computation, fully homomorphic encryption, 
blockchain, and more. This includes both how PQC 
migration and cryptographic agility will apply to each 
approach, and whether these developing cryptographic 
technologies can play a role in providing cryptographic 
agility and facilitating PQC migration. 
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